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Abstract
Friendship and antipathy exist in concert with one another in real social networks. Despite the role
they play in social interactions, antagonistic ties are poorly understood and infrequently measured. One
important theory of negative ties that has received relatively little empirical evaluation is balance theory,
the codification of the adage “the enemy of my enemy is my friend” and similar sayings. Unbalanced
triangles are those with an odd number of negative ties, and the theory posits that such triangles are rare.
To test for balance, previous works have utilized a permutation test on the edge signs. The flaw in this
method, however, is that it assumes that negative and positive edges are interchangeable. In reality, they
could not be more different. Here, we propose a novel test of balance that accounts for this discrepancy
and show that our test is more accurate at detecting balance. Along the way, we prove asymptotic
normality of the test statistic under our null model, which is of independent interest. Our case study is a
novel dataset of signed networks we collected from 32 isolated, rural villages in Honduras. Contrary to
previous results, we find that there is only marginal evidence for balance in social tie formation in this
setting.
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1. Introduction
Models of social network structure generally build on assumptions about myopic agents, whereby global
network features emerge from the dynamic local decision rules of individual agents (Holland, 1998; Kossinets
and Watts, 2006). For instance, if agents tend to attach to more central or popular actors, scaling emerges in
the degree distribution of the graph (Barabási and Albert, 1999); if people generally form connections with
those who are similar, social networks exhibit homophily (McPherson et al., 2001); if agents form infrequent
but random connections with other agents, the social graph has a small diameter, following the small-world
phenomenon (Watts and Strogatz, 1998).
All of these models, however, are restrictive in that they only apply to positive ties. Much less is
theorized or known about the fundamental properties of negative ties. In principle, they need not share the
same structural properties as their positive counterparts. Moreover, as most social graphs are signed (i.e.
have both positive and negative ties), this raises the question of how the presence of the negative ties affects
the surrounding positive network structure, and how we should model them concurrently.
One important theory of negative ties advanced by Heider (1946) relates to an agent’s desire for balance
in social relationships (Harary, 1959; Simmel, 2010). Balance theory postulates that a need for cognitive
consistency leads agents to seek to balance the valence in their local social systems. Simply stated, friends
should have the same friends and the same enemies. This translates, in graph-theoretic terms, to requiring the
product of the signs on a triangle to be positive. Triangles that violate this property are deemed unbalanced,
and the theory posits that such triangles should be rare compared to their balanced counterparts.
Balance theory is very simple to state and almost self-evident in nature. After all, it has already been
assimilated into thewider culture through such aphorisms as “the enemy of my enemy is my friend”. However,
as evidenced by the success of behavioral economics (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), human actors will
often act irrationally, even so far as to violate transitivity (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981). It is therefore not
unreasonable to envisage people violating transitivity in their social graph.
As it stands, balance theory has received sparing empirical evaluation. Tests of balance theory require
the observation of antagonistic connections between actors, but these ties are often either ignored when the
data is gathered, or simply unavailable due to the unwillingness of the actors themselves to divulge such
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information. Those studies which have been able to observe antagonistic ties have often done so in artificial
settings – and been very liberal about what constitutes an antagonistic tie – like nominations to adminship
on Wikipedia (Leskovec et al., 2010), and user ratings of trustworthiness in an e-commerce website (Guha
et al., 2004), rather than in face-to-face settings, with some exceptions (Mouttapa et al., 2004; Huitsing and
Veenstra, 2012; Xia et al., 2009).
Though the underlying datasets may be vastly different, these studies all resort to exactly the same
statistical test to verify balance in their signed networks: for the test statistic, they use the number of balanced
triangles as a measure of the degree of balance in a graph; the null model corresponds to a permutation
test on the edge weights of the observed graph. Drawing samples from the null distribution then reduces to
shuffling the signs on the graph. The simplicity of this null model belies its principal flaw though – namely,
that it treats negative and positive ties as interchangeable. The problem is that, as we shall soon demonstrate,
negative ties behave remarkably like random ties drawn from an Erdős-Rényi graph. Meanwhile, research
in social network modeling is predominantly focused on showing how disparate positive graphs are from
independent random graphs. Features like preferential attachment and clustering are fundamental to our
understanding of positive ties – features that are clearly absent in negative ties. Thus, by treating positive
and negative ties as exchangeable, this null hypothesis creates a test, not for balance, but for differences in
the behavior of positive and negative ties.
As an example, consider one of the social networks from our Honduras dataset, shown in Figure 1.
Decomposing the graph into its signed subgraphs reveals (b) a typical positive social network, and (c) a
negative subgraph that could be easily mistaken for a sample from a random graph model. The contrast
between the two subgraphs could not be more extreme, and clearly indicates that these two types of ties
should not be treated as exchangeable.
As the “replication crisis” (Collaboration et al., 2015) plays out in the scientific community, and notions
like p-hacking and “garden of forking paths” (Gelman and Loken, 2013) becomemainstream, one overlooked
but equally important issue is the selection of an appropriate null hypothesis. In most settings, there is a
canonical choice for the null hypothesis. On the other hand, in the context of complex social data such as
social networks, we no longer have this luxury, as it is difficult to accurately model such data with a simple
parametric model. In this regime, it is imperative to choose null models carefully.
The main contribution of this paper is to provide a new null model that resolves the issues raised
above. The crux of the solution is the following key observation: a crucial way in which negative and
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(a) Signed Graph
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(c) Negative Subgraph
Figure 1: (a) A signed social network (Village # 22). Much has been studied about the positive subgraph (b), but very
little is known about the negative subgraph (c). The example here suggests that the negative subgraph behaves more
like a random graph.
positive ties differ is through their embeddedness level (the number of triangles that tie is a member of)
– transitivity and homophily encourage higher levels of embeddedness in positive ties. For instance, the
average embeddedness of positive ties and negative ties in the network shown in Figure 1 was 1.2 and 0.5,
respectively. Our new method, therefore, is to stratify the permutation across embeddedness levels, thereby
ensuring that the embeddedness profiles of negative and positive ties remain invariant. This preserves the
fundamental differences between the two kinds of ties, creating a more accurate null model of a signed social
network without balance. This is supported by both our simulation studies and our theoretical results, where
we show that for a reasonable definition of absence of balance in a graph, the true type-I error rate of the old
4
test converges to 1 while the type-I error rate for the new test is consistent with the specified α.
To compare the relative performance of the two tests, we show asymptotic normality of the test statistic
under the two null models. Due to the stratified nature of the permutation, this is a nontrivial result, and, to
the best of our knowledge, this is the first result showing asymptotic normality of this type of graph statistic
under a stratified permutation model. The key insight is that a distribution derived from a permutation test –
even a stratified permutation – can be obtained as conditional distribution of independent random variables.
This is similar to the dichotomy between the G(n, p) and G(n,m) random graph model (Janson et al., 2011).
Under certain conditions, the limit and the conditioning operation may be interchanged, enabling us to carry
the central limit theorem result in the independent case to the permutation case. This proof technique of
Janson (2007) has wide applicability, not least in the nascent field of (nonparametric) inference on random
graphs.
Our final contribution is that we analyze a comprehensive dataset capturing both positive and negative ties
between individuals in a social network – namely, the networks of 32 villages in rural Honduras (Kim et al.,
2015). This novel dataset provides a first look into the behavior of interaction between negative and positive
human relationships. We find that negative ties behave very differently from positive ties. Applying our
new test of balance to the village networks reveals that balance barely registers as an underlying mechanism
dictating the structure of signed networks, which is contrary to the conclusions drawn from the previous
literature.
1.1. Organization. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we formally introduce the
notion of balance, describe the old null model, its fundamental flaws, and our proposed new null model. We
prove asymptotic normality of the test statistic under both null models in Section 3, and from this, we show
that the new test has a lower type-I error rate than the old test. This is also supported by the simulation studies
we perform in Section 4. Finally, in Section 5, we analyze the networks of 32 rural villages in Honduras.
2. Method
The theory of balance is an old theory, predating many of the “classic” celebrated ideas in social network
analysis. First proposed in Heider (1946), it was later made formal by Cartwright and Harary (1956), who
recast the theory into the more natural graph-theoretic framework. Given a signed undirected graph G, they
define a triangle to be unbalanced if the product of the signs of the edges is negative (−1). Specifically,
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the unbalanced triangles are those with one or three negative ties (t1 and t3 in Figure 2, respectively), while
the remaining two are balanced. The graph G is then deemed balanced if all the realized triangles of G are
balanced. A simple consequence of this definition is that G is balanced if and only if it can be decomposed
into two positive subgraphs that are joined by only negative edges (see Cartwright and Harary (1956)).
Y Z
X
friend friend
friend
t0
Y Z
X
friend friend
enemy
t1
Y Z
X
enemy enemy
friend
t2
Y Z
X
enemy enemy
enemy
t3
Figure 2: The four possible arrangements of positive and negative ties in a triangle with undirected ties. Balance
theory states that t1 and t3, with an uneven number of negative ties, are unbalanced.
One theorized psychological mechanism for balance theory is cognitive dissonance, the state of mental
strain a person experiences while holding two conflicting beliefs. This theory holds that it requires high
cognitive load to feel both animosity and goodwill towards others (Festinger, 1962). For instance, in the
case of t1 (Figure 2), Y holds negative feelings towards Z , but also, by transitivity through X , Y should
possess positive feelings towards Z , leading to cognitive dissonance. Balance theory posits that, to avoid
the cognitive strain from imbalance, individuals (Y ) will take measures to resolve such inconsistencies in
their local social system, such as switching the valence of their own relationships (befriend Z instead). On
the other hand, agents may choose to simply ignore the facts that are in conflict. The literature on cognitive
biases – e.g. the work of Tversky and Kahneman (1981) who showed that people are capable of violating the
transitivity of their own preferences – suggests that individuals might be unperturbed by, or simply unaware
of, such inconsistencies or lack the willpower to correct their local systems.
Here, we adopt the frequentist approach favored by the existing literature and devise a hypothesis test for
balance theory. Two ingredients are needed to specify such a test: a test statistic that measures the balance
on a graph, and a null model that describes a graph without balance. We begin with the choice of a measure
of balance. It is immediately obvious that the binary definition of balance from Cartwright and Harary
(1956) is highly impractical, as almost every social graph is equally “not balanced” under this definition,
even though some graphs are clearly more balanced than others. A more appropriate measure, and the one
used throughout this literature, is the number of unbalanced triangles, as higher levels of balance should
6
result in fewer unbalanced triangles.1 This count, however, is meaningless on its own.
The second and more important choice is the null model that describes a graph without balance, and it
is here that we diverge from the current literature. Despite the broad spectrum of application settings, the
existing literature is unanimous in its choice of a null model. This null model corresponds to one derived
from a permutation test, where the permutation is over the signs of the edges on the graph. To generate a
graph under this null model, we simply shuffle the signs on the observed graph. An equivalent formulation
is the following generative model. Start with a positive social graph (G), and suppose that negative ties are
only ever formed by switching the signs of positive ties. With a fixed budget of m negative ties, generate a
graph by picking m ties at random to switch.
To see why this describes a graph without balance, note that balance is a statement about the relation
between negative and positive ties, and makes claims about their relative positions on the graph. Thus, a
generative model where the sign of an edge is independent of its position on the graph is necessarily absent
of balance.
Having chosen a null model (and a test statistic), the test for balance is now fully specified. For an input
graphG, we test for balance by comparing the number of unbalanced triangles inG against the distribution of
the same statistic under the null model. The details of the general testing procedure are shown in Algorithm 1,
and the details for this test can be found in Algorithm 2. Note that this is a left-tailed test, as the presence of
balance should reduce the number of unbalanced triangles.
Algorithm 1 General Test for Balance
1: procedure TestBalance(G, N , NullModel) . N is the number of simulations
2: r ← TestStatistic(G) . observed statistic
3: for i ← 1 to N do
4: Gˆ← NullModel(G) . generate a graph under the null model
5: s[i] ← TestStatistic(Gˆ) . calculate the statistic on the new graph
6: end for
7: return the fraction of s ≤ r . calculate the p-value
8: end procedure
9: function TestStatistic(G) . unbalanced triangle count
10: return the number of triangles in G that have an odd number of negative ties
11: end function
This choice of null model has several flaws, however. First, it confines the formation of negative ties
1The ratio of unbalanced triangles to all triangles would seem like a more appropriate statistic, but since we are ultimately
performing a statistical test with a null model that leaves the number of triangles invariant, using the ratio is therefore equivalent to
using just the numerator.
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Algorithm 2 The Old Test
1: procedure OldTest(G, N)
2: return TestBalance(G, N , UniformPermute(G))
3: end procedure
4: procedure UniformPermute(G)
5: return PermuteSign(G, edges(G))
6: end procedure
7: function PermuteSign(G, E) . E is a subset of the edges of G
8: Permute the signs on the edge set E of G at random
9: return G
10: end function
to switches, meaning that it prohibits the formation of negative ties from nothing. However, this type of
behavior might have some semblance to reality, as it can be said that having negative feelings towards
someone presupposes that you know them well enough to dislike them. Additionally, if we do not restrict
the negative edges to the support, we then need to make a judgement as to how the presence of edges should
be modeled, which introduces even more subjectivity to the null model.
A more concerning issue is that this null model treats negative and positive ties as interchangeable. This
raises two problems. The first is that such an assumption is strictly stronger than assuming there is no balance.
Indeed, the two types of ties being exchangeable is equivalent to the sign of an edge being independent of
its location, which necessarily implies that there is no balance. Hence, this null model is in fact testing a
stronger statement than lack of balance, leading to a potentially inflated type-I error.
The second problem is that such an assumption is unrealistic. On the one hand, researchers have spent
the past few decades cataloging the various ways in which positive social networks differ from Erdős-Rényi
graphs. Social networks from a wide variety of settings have been found to share structural similarities
(Apicella et al., 2012), such as degree assortativity, transitivity, and homophily – all properties patently
absent in random graphs. On the other hand, as we demonstrate in Section 5, the negative tie subgraph
behaves remarkably similar to a random graph. Thus, by assuming that negative and positive ties are
exchangeable, the existing literature has chosen a test that is essentially condemned to significance.
Our main methodological contribution is that we devise a new null model that addresses the afore-
mentioned problems, through an appropriate adjustment to the permutation procedure. Instead of having a
uniform permutation across all edges, we instead stratify the permutation across edges of the same embed-
dedness. That is, for each embeddedness level, we independently perform a uniform permutation across the
8
subset of edges having that level of embeddedness. The exact steps of this procedure are described by the
function StratifiedPermute in Algorithm 3. Crucially, this stratified permutation leaves the embeddedness
profile of both negative and positive ties invariant. As a result, we maintain the embeddedness profiles of
both types of tie, while still ensuring there is enough flexibility to garner meaningful variability as a model
of a signed network without balance. Essentially, we argue that ties are only exchangeable at the same
embeddedness level.
Algorithm 3 The New Test
1: procedure NewTest(G, N)
2: return TestBalance(G, N , StratifiedPermute(G))
3: end procedure
4: procedure StratifiedPermute(G)
5: tc← the triangle membership count for each edge . e.g. tc = (1, 1, 3, 3, 0, 4)
6: utc← unique(tc), the unique counts in tc . e.g. utc = (1, 3, 0, 4)
7: for t in utc do
8: E ← the edges in G with triangle count t
9: G← PermuteSign(G, E)
10: end for
11: return G
12: end procedure
13: function PermuteSign(G, E) . E is a subset of the edges of G
14: Permute the signs on the edge set E of G at random
15: return G
16: end function
To clearly delineate the differences between our new model and the old model, consider a toy example
shown in Figure 3. In this social network, there is a core group of six individuals that have formed a clique,
as well as an additional three individuals on the periphery that have formed unbalanced triangles with the
core group. We claim that this network does not provide sufficient evidence for balance, meaning that a
test for balance should not reject it. One might argue on the contrary, as there are more balanced triangles
than unbalanced ones. However, the clique should not be treated as evidence for balance, as it can already
be explained by transitivity. For instance, a graph with no negative ties is “balanced” in that there are no
unbalanced triangles, but this is clearly not strong evidence supporting the full spectrum of balance. That is
why the key triangles to monitor are those with negative ties (t1, t2, t3 in Figure 2).
Applying the old test (fig. 3a), which ignores embeddedness levels, we see that it allows the negative
ties free rein over the entire support of the graph, including to the dense cluster in the middle, where the
embeddedness level is 5. This results in an artificially inflated mean of the null distribution. On the other
9
hand, our test (fig. 3b) restricts this edge to those positions with also embeddedness level of 1, shown in blue.
The old test incorrectly rejects the null, while the new test does not.
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l l
l
(a) Old (Uniform)
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l l
l
(b) New (Stratified)
Figure 3: Comparison of the two permutations. The blue edges correspond to the positions where the negative (red)
edges are able to be moved to under the different tests.
Finally, we discuss the apparent dynamic nature of balance. The intuitive interpretation of balance
presents itself as a dynamic process, one where individuals notice an unbalanced state and then correct it.
An appropriate test of balance would then involve monitoring the evolution of a graph to see if such local
corrections are observed. Ignoring the difficulty of obtaining dynamic graph data, we claim that this dynamic
analysis is problematic, as balance is not necessarily expressed in discrete steps. Consider the first scenario
in Figure 4, which shows a graph entering and leaving an unbalanced state. If we were to capture all three
states, we would flag this as an example of balance at play. Suppose, however, that the window of time
between events 1 and 2 is smaller than the resolution of the graph evolution samples. We would then recover
scenario two of Figure 4 instead, which would not be flagged as evidence for balance under a dynamic model,
even though there was a local correction. Thus, as tempting as it may be to treat balance in terms of dynamic
local corrections, we think it is more appropriate to consider balance as a holistic property of a graph. Of
course, the relative timing of data collection compared to the underlying social process is crucial here.
2.1. Graph-theoretic Formulation. Formally, assume that we are given an undirected signed graph G =
(V, E,W), where
• V, E are vertex and edge sets, respectively, with sizes given by |V | = N , |E | = n;
• W ∈ {−1,+1}n is a vector of edge signs.
10
+ −
ta
+
event 1 −
+
tb
+
event 2 −
−
tc
Scenario 1
+ −
ta
+
event 3 −
−
tc
Scenario 2
Figure 4: Dynamics of Balance. Two scenarios that start and end in the same balanced state, but the intermediary
steps are different.
Let 4, 4′ be the ordered and unordered triplet of indices that form a triangle in G, respectively:
4 B {(i, j, k) ∈ E3 : i, j, k form a triangle} ,
4′ B {(i, j, k) ∈ E3 : i, j, k form a triangle; i < j < k} .
Then, the number of triangles inG is equal to |4′ |, while |4| = 6|4′ |. The test statistic that we use to measure
balance is the number of unbalanced triangles, given by
U B
∑
(i, j,k)∈4′
1
{
WiWjWk = −1
}
.
One key property of edges that will play a central role in our analysis is its embeddedness, which we define
below.
Definition 1. The embeddedness of an edge i ∈ E , which we denote by εi, is the number of triangles that
edge i is a part of:
εi B
1
2
∑
(j,k)∈E2
1 {(i, j, k) ∈ 4} .
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Denote by τ a random variable which is uniformly distributed over the set of all permutations of E –
namely over the symmetric group Sn (of size n!). This enables us to define a random weight vector Wτ
by (Wτ)i = Wτ(i). Then, the old null model is equivalent to the graph-valued random variable given by
Gτ = (V, E,Wτ) 2. We shall use Gτ interchangeably to mean either the random variable or the associated
probability distribution over signed graphs.
Model 1 (Old Model). The graph has distribution Gτ , where τ is uniformly distributed over Sn.
The old null hypothesis then corresponds to Hτ0 : G ∼ Gτ , while the number of unbalanced triangles
now takes the form
Uτ B
∑
(i, j,k)∈4′
1
{
Wτ(i)Wτ(j)Wτ(k) = −1
}
.
The new null hypothesis differs from the old null hypothesis in the choice of random permutation. Instead
of being uniformly distributed over all permutations of E , the new random variable, which we denote by pi,
is a (disjoint) composition of uniform permutations, one for each level of embeddedness.
Model 2 (New Model). The graph has distribution Gpi , where pi is given by
pi(E) B (τL ◦ . . . ◦ τ1) (E),
where L is the maximum embeddedness level of G, and τl is uniformly distributed over permutations of the
set of edges with embeddedness l, denoted by El, and all other edges are untouched.
The new null hypothesis is now Hpi0 : G ∼ Gpi , and the corresponding test statistic is given by
Upi =
∑
(i, j,k)∈4′
1
{
Wτεi (i)Wτε j (j)Wτεk (k) = −1
}
.
Note that pi is determined completely by the set {(ml, nl)}Ll=0, where nl is the number of edges of embeddedness
2This uniform random permutation is technically overkill, as it actually only has an effective size of
(n
m
)
, where m is the number
of negative ties, since we are only permutating the signs around.
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l and ml is the number of negative edges of embeddedness l:
nl =
∑
i∈E
1 {εi = l} ,
ml =
∑
i∈E
1 {εi = l,Wi = −1} .
3. Asymptotics of the Null Distribution
One drawback of a permutation test is that the accompanying null distribution has no closed form.
Monte Carlo methods are required to approximate the distribution, and, for large graphs, the number of
samples needed for an accurate approximation might be prohibitive. Additionally, the lack of a closed form
makes it difficult to compare different null distributions. We resolve both issues by showing that our statistic,
namely, the number of unbalanced triangles, is asymptotically normal under the new null hypothesis, and
therefore can be reasonably approximated by a normal distribution with known moments 3. This is the main
theoretical result of the paper (Theorem 2).
The distribution of sums of permutation-based random variables are notoriously difficult to analyze
as the random variables themselves are no longer independent. Thankfully, there is already a whole field
dedicated to these types of results, known as combinatorial central limit theorems. This field was founded by
Hoeffding in his seminal paper (Hoeffding, 1951), in which he utilized the method of moments. Subsequent
results have used variations of Stein’s method to prove more general combinatorial CLTs (see Barbour et al.
(1989)). While it is a relatively straightforward exercise to extend the results of Barbour and Chen (2005) to
show asymptotic normality under the old null hypothesis, the additional structure introduced by our stratified
permutation renders this approach infeasible.
Inspired by the results of Janson (2007), we instead take a completely different approach. The key insight
is that the distribution of the stratified permutation model is a conditional distribution of a much simpler
model, where the signs are distributed as independent (non-symmetric) Rademacher random variables, and
the conditioning is on the number of negative ties in each stratum.
3.1. Notation. Fix a signed graph G = (V, E,W). We can associate with G a new graph-valued random
variable, Gp = (V, E, X), having the same support as G, but with a random weight vector X comprising of
3Ideally, we would have a Berry-Esseen type result here to quantify precisely the error in the normal approximation. We leave
this for future work.
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independent (non-symmetric) Rademacher random variables. Concretely, the weight vector X is given by
Xi ∼ Rad
(
1 − pεi
)
, with P (Xi = 1) = 1 − pεi, P (Xi = −1) = pεi , where pεi =
mεi
nεi
. By construction, edges
of the same embeddedness level will have the same probability of being negative under Gp. The statistic for
Gp corresponds to
Vp B
∑
(i, j,k)∈4′
1
{
XiXjXk = −1
}
.
3.2. Main Results. The relation between Gp and Gpi is given by the following Lemma.
Lemma 1. Denote by Ml the number of negative ties with embeddedness l in Gp. Then the distribution of
Gpi is just the conditional distribution of Gp, conditional on the event M = m, where M = {Ml}Ll=0 and
m = {ml}Ll=0. In particular,
L (Upi) = L
(
Vp | M = m
)
.
The proof is deferred to Appendix B. With respect to proving a CLT we must first define a sequence
of graphs. Let
{
G(n)
}∞
n=1 be a fixed sequence of signed graphs, indexed by the number of edges. Then,
Gpi,Gp extend naturally to sequences of graph-valued random variables,
{
G(n)pi
}∞
n=1
,
{
G(n)p
}∞
n=1
with statistics{
U(n)pi
}∞
n=1
,
{
V (n)p
}∞
n=1
. To simplify notation, we will sometimes drop the index n. For instance, we still write
El, pi and pl,ml, keeping in mind the dependence on n.
Lemma 1 suggests that we can obtain a CLT for U(n)pi by proving one for V
(n)
p , which should be much
easier by independence of edges in G(n)p . In general, however, weak convergence does not imply conditional
weak convergence. The crucial property that enables one to interchange conditioning and limits is stochastic
monotonicity, which we define below. Here, we use the partial order x ≤ y for vectors x, y ∈ Rd defined by
xi ≤ yi for all i.
Definition 2. Let V ∈ Rq and M ∈ Rr be random vectors. We say that V is stochastically increasing with
respect to M if the conditional distribution L(V | M = m) is increasing in m. That is, if for any v ∈ Rq and
m1 ≤ m2, we have
P (V ≤ v | M = m1) ≥ P (V ≤ v | M = m2) .
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We say thatV is stochastically decreasingwith respect to M if −V is stochastically increasing with respect to
M , and V is stochastically monotone with respect to M if it is either stochastically increasing or decreasing
with respect to M .
Based on stochastic monotonicity it is indeed possible to transform weak convergence to conditional
weak convergence. This beautiful result is known as Nerman’s Theorem (Nerman (1998); Janson (2007)).
Theorem 1 (Nerman’s Theorem). Let V (n) ∈ Rq and M (n) ∈ Rr be random vectors such that V (n) is
stochastically increasing with respect to M (n). Assume that
(a−1n (V (n) − bn), c−1n (M (n) − dn))
D−→ (V,M)
for random vectors V ∈ Rq,M ∈ Rr and an, cn > 0, bn ∈ Rq, dn ∈ Rr . Let also mn ∈ Rr be a sequence
such that c−1n (mn − dn) → ξ ∈ Rr and let U(n) be a random vector with distribution L(V (n) | M (n) = mn).
Suppose that ξ is an interior point of the support of M and that there exists a version ofm 7→ L(V | M = m)
continuous at m = ξ as a function of m ∈ Rr into P(Rq), the set of probability measures of Rq. Then,
a−1n
(
U(n) − bn
) D−→ L(V | M = m).
The number of unbalanced triangles is not stochastically monotone with respect to the number of negative
ties in each stratum, so we cannot apply this theorem directly to V (n)p . It is not hard to see, however, that the
count of triangles having at least α = 1, 2, 3 negative ties satisfies stochastic monotonicity. Let Tα denote the
number of triangles in Gp with α negative ties. Then, we have the following result:
Lemma 2. The vector HT = (T3,T3 +T2,T3 +T2 +T1) is stochastically decreasing with respect to M , where
T B (T1,T2,T3), M B (M0, . . . ,ML) and the matrix H, given by Hx = (x3, x3 + x2, x3 + x2 + x1) for x ∈ R3,
is invertible.
The proof is deferred to Appendix B. Consider the corresponding random variables T (n) and T (n)α with
respect to G(n)p . Lemma 2 and Corollary 2.5 of Janson (2007) show that also T (n) is stochastically decreasing
with respect to M (n). Since V (n)p = T
(n)
1 + T
(n)
3 , it now suffices to prove a CLT for (T (n),M (n)). This requires
two mild assumptions.
Assumption 1. The embeddedness level of negative ties in
{
G(n)
}∞
n=1 is bounded from above by L < ∞.
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Our first assumption is predominantly a technical one, as Nerman’s Theorem does not apply when L is
unbounded4. On the other hand, it implies that the number of triangles is at most of order O(n), because,
according to the definition of embeddedness,
∑
(i, j,k)∈E3
1 {(i, j, k) ∈ 4} = 2 ∑
i∈E
εi = 2
L∑
l=0
nll ≤ 2Ln. (1)
AccompanyingAssumption 1wemake the followingminor adjustment to our permutation procedure. Instead
of performing permutations on every level of embeddedness level present in the graph, we shall only apply
permutations to embeddedness levels of at most L. The advantage afforded by this modification is that it
makes no restrictions on the maximum embeddedness level of positive ties. Notationally, this means that E
no longer reflects all edges in G, but only those edges having embeddedness ≤ L.
Moreover, in practice, the embeddedness level does not grow with the size of the graph. For instance,
across the 32 village networks in our dataset (with the number of edges (n) ranging from 54 to 1109), the
largest embeddedness for negative ties was 5, while the largest embeddedness for positive ties was 13. In
fact, the largest graph (with 1109 edges) had a maximum embeddedness for negative ties of only 2.
Assumption 2. For l1, l2, l3 = 0, . . . , L define El1,l2,l3 B El1 × El2 × El3 . We assume that all partial sums
1
n
∑
(i, j,k)∈El1, l2, l3
4i jk, 1n
∑
i∈El1
©­«
∑
(j,k)∈El2, l3
4i jkª®¬ ©­«
∑
(j′,k′)∈El4, l5
4i j′k′ª®¬ ,
converge to a limit as n→∞. Separately, we require pl = mlnl to also converge to a limit as n→∞.
This assumption is needed to ensure that the limiting covariance terms exist. We require such a condition
because our statistic is intimately related to the structure of the sequence
{
G(n)
}∞
n=1, which is fixed. This
contrasts with other random graph models where the support of the graph is the main modeling task. A
simple consequence of Assumption 2 is that
nl
n
also converges, as
1
2l
L∑
l2,l3=0
1
n
∑
(i, j,k)∈El, l2, l3
4i jk = 22nl
∑
i∈El
εi =
1
nl
nll =
nl
n
(2)
shows that
nl
n
is a finite, linear combination of terms that converge. According to eq. (1) the means of T (n)α
4Though it should be possible to extend Nerman’s Theorem to infinite-dimensional distributions.
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are of orderO(n). The proof of Proposition 1 shows that this is also true for the variances. Consider therefore
the random variables T˜ (n) B 1√
n
(
T (n) − E
(
T (n)
))
, M˜ (n) B 1√
n
(
M (n) − E
(
M (n)
))
.
Proposition 1. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, we have
(
T˜ (n), M˜ (n)
) D−→ (T˜, M˜) ∼ N(0, Σ),
where Σ is defined in the proof of the proposition.
The proof is deferred to Appendix A. We are now ready to state and prove our main theorem.
Theorem 2. Grant Assumptions 1 and 2. Under the new null hypothesis, Hpi0 , we have that the normalized
count of unbalanced triangles has a limiting normal distribution:
n−1/2
(
U(n)pi − E
(
V (n)p
)) D−→ N(0, σ2u),
with σ2u = Σs1,1 + Σ
s
3,3 + 2Σ
s
1,3 and Σ
s = ΣT˜,T˜ − ΣT˜,M˜Σ−1M˜,M˜Σ
>
T˜,M˜
, where ΣT˜,T˜ , ΣM˜,M˜ and ΣT˜,M˜ are the
covariance matrices of T˜, M˜ from Proposition 1.
Proof. Proposition 1 gives us joint asymptotic normality of (T˜ (n), M˜ (n)). By stochastic monotonicity of
(T (n),M (n)) (Lemma 2), we can apply Corollary 2.5 of Janson (2007) (a variation of Nerman’s Theorem) to
get
S˜(n) B L
(
T˜ (n) | M˜ (n) = 0
) D−→ L (T˜ | M˜ = 0) .
Since (T˜, M˜) has a joint normal distribution, it is well known that the conditional distribution is also normally
distributed. In other words, S˜(n) D−→ S˜ ∼ N(0, Σs) and, in particular,
n−1/2
(
U(n)pi − E
(
V (n)p
))
= S˜(n)1 + S˜
(n)
3
D−→ N(0, σ2u).

Remark. Note that M˜ (n)
l
is degenerate if mln → 0. To ensure that we don’t invert a degenerate covariance ma-
trix, we can simply remove the degenerate M˜ (n)
l
from M˜ (n). The result still holds, as stochastic monotonicity
is maintained with the smaller M˜ (n).
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From the form of the limiting distribution, it is clear that the asymptotic means ofU(n)pi and V
(n)
p coincide
(though the variances differ). This suggests that one could save a lot of trouble by adopting the independent
modelGp instead of using the permutation modelGpi , with little difference in results besides some inevitable
increase in variance. This is indeed true when the size of the graph is very large, but for the rest, like the
graphs we collected in our dataset, the discrepancy between the two models is nontrivial. In particular, due
to the small size of our graphs, and the small number of negative ties observed, empirically we find that
the graphs generated under the independent model will often have no negative ties, rendering the task of
measuring balance moot.
As a byproduct, we also obtain asymptotic normality for U(n)τ in the old model.
Corollary 1. Asymptotic normality ofU(n)τ , the statistic under Model 1, follows from Theorem 2, by replacing
the vector
{
M (n)
l
}L
l=0
by the sum
∑L
l=0 M
(n)
l
, and letting pεi = mn for all i ∈ E .
3.3. Comparison of the TwoModels. We have argued in Section 2 that a graph can be considered balance-
free, if the sign of an edge is independent of its position in the graph, relative to its embeddedness. Among
other issues, ignoring embeddedness means treating all edge labels as exchangeable which is not true for
social networks. We concluded that reasonably balance-free graphs can be generated with respect to the
restricted random permutation pi. Building on this idea, in this section we will construct a hierarchy of
generative models producing balance-free graphs and show, if these graphs are assumed as null models, that
the old test with respect to the critical values cα,τ derived from Model 1 has Type-I error converging to 1
as n→ ∞, while our test with critical values cα,pi from Model 2 has Type-I error matching the specified α.
This proves formally that the new test is more conservative than the old one. Section 4 will show, on the
other hand, that the new test still detects balance, if it exists.
Arguing by the normal approximations in Theorem 2 and Corollary 1, comparing the critical values
essentially reduces to comparing the means and variances of Gaussians. This yields the following result.
Proposition 2. Grant Assumptions 1 and 2 and assume that there exists a constant c > 0 such that for large
n
(1 − p)2
∑
i∈E εi
n
−
∑
i∈E− εi
m
> cm1/2 logm, (3)
where E− ⊂ E is the set of negative ties in G(n). Then P
(
U(n)pi ≤ cα,pi
)
→ α, while P
(
U(n)pi ≤ cα,τ
)
→ 1 as
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n→∞, i.e. the Type-I error of the original test applied to graphs generated by G(n)pi converges to 1.
The proof is deferred to Appendix B. Observe that eq. (3) requires the difference in the average embed-
dedness values of all ties versus just negative ties to have enough separation. These two terms essentially
reflect the means of the two distributions.
Now, let us generalize the model. Instead of using the stratified permutation, the same results hold if we
are under the Rademacher model G(n)p . To see why, recall that the permutation model can be obtained by
conditioning of the Rademacher model (Lemma 1). From Proposition 2 it follows that the Type-I error for
the old test under G(n)pi converges to 1. Since the Type-I error for G
(n)
p is a weighted average of these terms,
it must also converge to 1 as n→∞.
Finally, we can generalize the balance-free graph modelGp even further by expanding the set of possible
locations of negative ties to outside the support ofG. In other words, every 2 |V | possible edges has probability
pεi of being negative. For those locations without an edge present, one can define a pseudo-embeddedness
value, by the number of triangles that would be added if there was an edge in that location. The only caveat
is that the support of the graph now varies between samples, but since the variability is minimal, the results
should still hold.
4. Simulations
In this section, we first provide empirical verification of our theoretical results showing asymptotic
normality of the statistic under Model 2, the stratified permutation null model. The rest of the section is
then dedicated to comparing the performance of the tests under generative models of graphs without balance
(H0) as well as graphs with balance (H1). Under models of balance-free graphs, we show that our test is
non-significant, while the old test exhibits spurious significance. This corroborates with our analysis of the
Type-I error in Section 3.3. Finally, we simulate graphs with balance, and show that our test maintains the
same level of statistical power as the old test. Since our test is generally more conservative, this is the best
result possible.
4.1. Asymptotic Distribution. Wegenerated three progressively larger graphs from aWatts-Strogatzmodel
(Watts and Strogatz, 1998), with parameters given in Table 1, and then randomly assigned a fraction of these
edges to be negative. We ran 104 Monte Carlo simulations to calculate the empirical distribution of the
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number of unbalanced triangles under Hpi0 . These empirical distributions are shown in Figure 5, where we
see a clear trend towards convergence to normality.
n ≈ 103 n ≈ 104 n ≈ 105
−2.5 0.0 2.5 −2.5 0.0 2.5 −2.5 0.0 2.5
0.0
0.2
0.4
Figure 5: Histogram of the sample null distribution given the three base graphs, with the density curve of a standard
Normal distribution superimposed.
dim size nei p
n ≈ 103 3 4 3 0.2
n ≈ 104 3 6 3 0.2
n ≈ 105 5 10 5 0.1
Table 1: Parameters used in each model of the Watts-Strogatz graph. dim: the dimension of the starting lattice; size: the
size of the lattice along each dimension; nei: the neighborhood within which the vertices of the lattice will be connected; p: the
rewiring probability.
4.2. Performance Comparisons.
4.2.1. Comparison underH0. To ensure a fair comparison, we chose completely differentmodels of balance-
free graphs from the permutation based models our tests use. Our generating process is to superimpose an
negative Erdős-Rényi graph onto a positive graph. This results in the two edge sets being independent, and
hence produces a graph that is balance-free. For the positive subgraph model, we would like to use a graph
model that is a faithful representation of real-life social networks. Here we present two choices.
Choice 1: Small-world. In this simulation model, we generate the positive part of the social network
from the Watts-Strogatz model (Watts and Strogatz, 1998). The model parameters we used in this simulation
are dim = 1, size = 100, nei = 2, and we varied the rewiring probabilities from p = 0.1, 0.2, 0.3. We draw
103 samples each from three instances of the above generative model, and compare the p-values the two tests
produce, the histograms of which are shown in Figure 6. For a rewiring probability of p = 0.1, we find that
the old test is rejecting all 103 graphs, at a significance value of 0%. On the other hand, the new test rejects
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the null only 10% of the time. As we increase p, the graph becomes more like an Erdős-Rényi graph, and
the two tests tend towards uniformity, though from opposite directions. Crucially, in all three instances of p,
our new test is conservative about rejecting the null, while the new test is not.
p=0.1 p=0.2 p=0.3
0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00 0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00 0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
0.0
2.5
5.0
7.5
p−value
de
ns
ity type
stratified
uniform
Figure 6: Histogram of the p-value for differing parameters of the Watts-Strogatz model
Choice 2: Real Data. A simple way to ensure that the positive subgraph possesses the features we
see in real data is to just use real data. We simply removed the negative edges from the social networks
we collected, leaving a positive subgraph. The negative Erdős-Rényi graph is then added. Selecting three
representative villages, we draw 103 samples each from the three resulting models and compare the p-values
we get from the two tests. The histograms are shown in Figure 7. We see a similar story across the villages,
with the old test rejecting very often, while the new test almost never rejects.
#3 #12 #29
0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00 0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00 0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
0
3
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9
p−value
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uniform
Figure 7: Histogram of the p-values for a sample of the village networks (#2, #12, #29).
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4.2.2. Comparison under H1. In order to derive a model of a graph with balance, it will be informative to
revisit the original definition of balance in (Heider, 1946). There, a graph is balanced if and only if it can be
decomposed into two “communities” such that positives ties are within communities and negative ties are
between. Define a signed stochastic blockmodel as the combination of two stochastic blockmodels (SBM)
over the same community structure, one for each sign5. For notational convenience, we shall only consider
the symmetric 2-community model. Let the parameters of the two SBMs be given by
B+ =

p+ q+
q+ p+
 B
− =

p− q−
q− p−

Then, balance corresponds to q+ = p− = 0. On the other hand, the graph is balance-free when p+ = q+ and
p− = q−. A natural solution to modeling a graph with balance is therefore one where the parameteres are
somewhere between the two degenerate solutions.
We ran the model with three different sets of parameters (see Table 2), and the histograms of p-values
are shown in Figure 8. The distribution of p-values in the presence of balance are the same across the two
methods, which demonstrates that our method doesn’t lose out on statistical power. Compared to Model 1
and 2, the level of balance in Model 3 is much lower, and accordingly, the tests are more uncertain, leading
to a more uniform distribution.
n p+ q+ p− q−
Model 1 100 0.4 0.1 0.03 0.1
Model 2 50 0.3 0 0 0.3
Model 3 50 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.3
Table 2: Parameters used in each model of the signed SBM.
5. Case Study: Villages in Rural Honduras
Signed networks were first studied in the context of international relations: Harary (1961); Moore (1979)
studied several international conflicts, from theMiddle Eastern Suez Crisis of 1956 to the Indo-PakistaniWar
of 1971, while Antal et al. (2006) studied the evolution of alliances during World War I. Similarly, though
at a scale considerably smaller than nation-states, Hage (1973); Hage and Harary (1984) studied the New
5Clashes between two edges are deemed as void.
22
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
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Figure 8: Histogram of the p-values from testing for balance in the signed SBM.
Guinea tribe warfare relations. The nodes in these signed graphs are all collective entities, as opposed to
individuals, and the ties themselves are primarily focused on warfare, rather than simple social engagements.
The actual sociocentric mapping of negative ties in parallel with positive ties in social networks is
uncommon (Everett and Borgatti, 2014). Rawlings and Friedkin (2017) examined antagonistic ties in 129
people in a sample of 31 urban communes in the USA from the 1970’s, and the classic Sampson (1969) study
of 18 novitiate monks collected information about members of the group who were disliked. Studies have
also mapped helpful and adversarial relationships in small groups in classrooms (Huitsing and Veenstra,
2012; Mouttapa et al., 2004) or workplaces (Xia et al., 2009; Labianca and Brass, 2006). Other work has
examined the networks formed by wild mammals (Ilany et al., 2013; Lea et al., 2010).
A more recent source of signed networks are those derived from online websites: Kunegis et al. (2009)
considered the endorsement graph on the web forum Slashdot; Guha et al. (2004) analyzed the trust/distrust
network on the online review website Epinions; and Burke and Kraut (2008) looked at the public voting
records for Wikipedia admin candidates. Online networks have the advantage of scale (the above networks
are on the order of 105 nodes), but their artifically constructed notions of valence make them much less
generalizable to real world settings.
5.1. Rural Social Networks Study. In the summer of 2010, the Rural Social Networks Study (RSNS)
collected data on the social networks of around 5000 respondents spread across 32 rural villages in the La
Union, Lempira region of Honduras (Kim et al., 2015). The villages are geographically close to one another
but there is little between-village communication. The study gave a small survey to about 87 percent of the
respondents in each village before playing a set of economic games. The survey included a small number of
demographic controls and concentrated on “name generators” to collect data on the social networks of each
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village.
For the name generators, the RSNS used a photographic census of all residents, coupled with bespoke
software (a much revised version of which, known as Trellis, is available online at http://trellis.
yale.edu/). This software program was created to use photographs for the identification of “alters” to
increase accuracy and efficiency of collecting social network data in the field. The photos help solve the
name similarity problem. For instance, in one village, there were 16 Maria Hernandezs.
The name generators primarily focused on receiving strong affective relationships of each respondent:
kinship, best friends, and matrimony. But the study also asked a question about “general dislike”. In all,
about 10 percent responded with alters to the negative affective name generator. One of the weaknesses of
self-reported antagonistic ties is that people display a reticence to speak negatively of other people in their
communities to strangers. We assume that the actual levels of animosity in these communities are higher
than we are able to report because of this social desirability. Name generators, by their very nature, produce
data that is directional. We shall work with the symmetrized undirected version of this dataset.
5.2. The Behaviour of Negative Ties. We begin by considering the negative ties as a separate entity, and
compare their behavior to positive ties. Figure 9 shows representative village subgraphs of each type. Even
usually, there is no mistaking the two. The positive subgraphs are as expected, conforming to our established
ideas of social networks. Meanwhile, the negative subgraphs are extremely sparse, with most ties being
isolated, and almost all the components are trees (i.e. no cycles). There are instances of cycles, but they
are exceedingly rare. In fact, as hinted earlier, the negative subgraphs bear a striking resemblance instead to
sparse random graphs, with their locally tree-like structure.
More concretely, we calculated various graph statistics aggregated over the 32 villages, which we show
in the first two rows of Table 3. We see that negative ties are much less common than positive ties, exhibit
very little transitivity, do not form long connected paths, nor do they coagulate into a giant component –
corroborating our observational conclusions. In other words, they lack the common features found in positive
social networks.
To facilitate themore appropriate comparison with sparse random graphs, we generated, for each negative
subgraph, an associated Erdős-Rényi graph under the G(n,m) model with the same n,m as the village graph
(where n is the number of nodes, and m is the number of negative ties). The same graph statistics were
calculated on this random graph sequence (shown in the third row (Rnd.) of Table 3). As expected, these
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(a) Village # 11: Negative
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(b) Village # 11: Positive
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(c) Village # 26: Negative
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(d) Village # 26: Positive
Figure 9: Representitive examples of negative and positive subgraphs. In (b), there is evidence of clustering into two
communities. On the other hand, the negative subgraphs contain many components of very long trees. The largest
component in (c), for instance, would never be mistaken for a positive social network.
numbers are very similar to that of the negative subgraphs. Of particular note is that the transitivity in the
random graphs is higher than that from the negative subgraph, suggesting that negative ties might be repelled
from forming triangles.
5.3. Interdependence between Negative and Positive Ties. So far, we have considered negative ties in
isolation, as an entity separate and independent of their positive counterparts. However, such independent
analysis can only provide a partial picture, as it ignores the positive landscape in which the negative ties are
embedded. The same can be said for positive ties. It is therefore crucial that we understand the interactions
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Type # Edges Graph Density Transitivity Mean Path Length # Components
Pos. 331.9 0.056 0.26 3.59 1.66
Neg. 19.7 0.002 0.01 1.87 8.44
Rnd. - - 0.04 1.32 13.59
Graph Density is the ratio of edges to the number of possible edges
# Components is the number of non-denegerate components, ignoring isolated vertices
Table 3: Average values of select graph statistics across the two subgraphs (positive
and negative) of the 32 village networks, as well as an Erdős-Rényi graph with the
same number of edges and vertices as the negative subgraph.
between positive and negative ties, as to start building the foundations for a simultaneous model of positive
and negative relationships on a network.
Before we investigate balance, we shall first test for structural differences between negative and postive
ties. That is, we shall compare the average embeddedness levels of the two types, under the original null
model. We find that 17 graphs are significant at the 5% level, out of a possible 28 graphs (4 graphs have
no negative ties). This further reinforces our claim that negative and positive ties are structurally different.
Crucially, all 17 graphs found significant in structural differences were also significant for the old test. If we
look at a contingency table between these two tests (Table 4a), and the mass on the diagonal, it is clear that the
old test is essentially a test for structural differences in disguise. The conclusion, erroneously drawn, would
be that balance is highly significant, which would corroborate/align with the conclusions of the previous
literature (Facchetti et al., 2011).
N.S S
N.S 9 2
S 0 17
(a) Structural vs. Uniform
N.S. S
N.S. 9 9
S. 0 10
(b) Stratified vs. Uniform
Table 4: Contigency table between the various tests. N.S.Not Significant; S. Significant, where significance is defined
at the 5 % level.
Applying our new test to the dataset, we find that at the 5% level, instead of the 19 graphs found
significant from the old test, only half of them are actually significant. The exact significance levels are
shown in Table 5. While there is sufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis that these social networks do
not follow balance, it is clear that balance is not a ubiquitous force. In fact, with only a minority of villages
exhibiting balance, the natural question then arises of what makes some social networks more receptive to
balancing forces than others.
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ID uniform structural stratified
1 0.15 0.14 1.00
2 0.22 0.37 0.31
4 0.19 0.19 1.00
5 0.00 ∗∗ 0.02 ∗ 0.01 ∗
6 0.00 ∗∗∗ 0.00 ∗∗∗ 0.07 .
7 0.24 0.22 1.00
8 0.01 ∗ 0.01 ∗ 1.00
9 0.00 ∗∗∗ 0.06 . 0.00 ∗∗∗
10 0.00 ∗∗∗ 0.01 ∗∗ 0.00 ∗∗∗
11 0.00 ∗∗∗ 0.00 ∗∗∗ 0.36
12 0.00 ∗∗∗ 0.01 ∗∗ 0.02 ∗
13 0.00 ∗∗∗ 0.00 ∗∗∗ 0.00 ∗∗
14 0.10 0.25 0.14
15 0.24 0.50 0.22
16 0.04 ∗ 0.04 ∗ 1.00
19 0.07 . 0.38 0.06 .
20 0.52 0.51 1.00
21 0.00 ∗∗∗ 0.03 ∗ 0.00 ∗∗∗
22 0.00 ∗∗∗ 0.00 ∗∗∗ 0.39
23 0.00 ∗∗∗ 0.00 ∗∗∗ 0.01 ∗
24 0.00 ∗∗∗ 0.00 ∗∗∗ 0.06 .
25 0.01 ∗∗ 0.01 ∗∗ 1.00
26 0.00 ∗∗∗ 0.00 ∗∗∗ 0.00 ∗∗
27 0.00 ∗∗ 0.00 ∗∗ 1.00
28 0.29 0.27 1.00
29 0.00 ∗∗∗ 0.06 . 0.00 ∗∗
30 0.00 ∗∗∗ 0.01 ∗∗ 0.00 ∗∗∗
31 0.01 ∗∗ 0.04 ∗ 0.07 .
. — 0.05 ≤ p < 0.1, * — 0.01 ≤ p < 0.05,
** — 0.005 ≤ p < 0.01,
*** — 0 ≤ p < 0.005
Table 5: Table showing the results of three
statistical tests on each village network. The
nine rows in bold are those where the uniform
test is significant while the stratified is not.
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6. Conclusion and Future Work
Models of social network structure and function would benefit from not ignoring negative ties. Our
hope is that, in much the same way that moving from R to C produces new insights and simplifications, the
extension to signed graphs can provide simple mechanisms to hitherto complicated models.
Balance theory is potentially one such mechanism. In this paper, we introduced a new test for balance
that, unlike the standard test currently being used, takes into consideration the different behaviors of negative
and positive ties. We showed through theoretical analysis and simulations that our test outperforms the
original. We applied our test to a novel dataset of village social networks in rural Honduras, and found that
balance theory holds true in a minority of the villages, though the villages varied in their extent of balance.
There is much more to be done in this nascent field of understanding and modeling signed social
networks. In addition to the task of understanding the causes of the distribution of balancing effects across
social networks, we also have the following future directions:
• The count of unbalanced triangles is by its very nature a global measure of balance. For reasonable
sized graphs such as our village dataset, a global measure is appropriate. However, once we move
towards much larger social networks – especially those on the order of, say, Facebook’s social graph –
the assumption that there is one measure of balance across the entire graph is no longer tenable. This
regime requires a completely new framework for measuring and interpreting balance, the first step of
which is to define a new local definition of balance.
• The definition of balance as a function of the product of signs extends effortlessly to higher order
cycles. Here, we have restricted our attention to triads, as we think the first order is the most important
(and most plausible). There has been some work considering higher order cycles (Estrada and Benzi,
2014; Iosifidis et al., 2018), but little justification for doing so. Similarly, while balance theory is the
most natural means of relating negative and positive ties, perhaps there are other types of relations
possible.
A. Proof of Proposition 1
Our goal in this section is to prove that, under Model 2, the joint distribution of (T (n),M (n)) has a limiting
normal distribution. For simplicity, we drop the index n most of the time. The first step in this proof is to
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decompose the centered versions of the Tα’s in the spirit of a Hoeffding decomposition (Lemma 3). Then,
in Proposition 3, we show joint asymptotic normality of these decomposed random variables along with the
Ml’s. Finally, we recompose them to get the desired result.
Let us first establish some additional notation. Recall that we are working under Model 2, so that the
edge signs are independent and given by Xi ∼ Rad
(
1 − pεi
)
. Then,
ri B E (Xi) = 1 − 2pεi, s2i B Var (Xi) = 4pεi (1 − pεi ),
and we can define the normalized Xi by X˜i B Xi−risi . On multiple occasions in the forthcoming proofs, it
will be more intuitive to work with the Bernoulli random variable signifying the presence of a negative
edge at position i, Yi B 1−Xi2 ∼ Bern(pεi ), rather than the Rademacher random variable Xi. Finally, define
4i jk B 1 {(i, j, k) ∈ 4}. Then the number of triangles with 1 negative tie is given by
T1 =
1
2!
∑
(i, j,k)∈4
Yi(1 − Yj)(1 − Yk)
=
1
2
∑
(i, j,k)∈E3
4i jkYi(1 − Yj)(1 − Yk),
where the factor 12 comes from overcounting. Similarly,
T2 =
1
2
∑
(i, j,k)∈E3
YiYj(1 − Yk), T3 = 16
∑
(i, j,k)∈E3
YiYjYk .
Lemma 3. We have for α, β = 1, 2, 3 the decompositions Tα − E (Tα) = ∑3β=1 Tα,β with
Tα,1 B
∑
i∈E
tα,1(i)X˜i,
Tα,2 B
∑
(i, j)∈E2
tα,2(i, j)X˜i X˜j,
Tα,3 B
∑
(i, j,k)∈E3
tα,3(i, j, k)X˜i X˜j X˜k,
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and
t1,1(i) B si
∑
(j,k)∈E2
4i jk
16
(1 − 3pε j )(1 − pεk ), t1,2(i, j) B sisj
∑
k∈E
4i jk
16
(3pεk − 2),
t2,1(i) B si
∑
(j,k)∈E2
4i jk
16
pε j (3pεk − 2), t2,2(i, j) B sisj
∑
k∈E
4i jk
16
(1 − 3pεk ),
t3,1(i) B si
∑
(j,k)∈E2
4i jk
16
(
−pε j pεk
)
, t3,2(i, j) B sisj
∑
k∈E
4i jk
16
pεk ,
t1,3(i, j, k) = −t2,3(i, j, k) = 13 t3,3(i, j, k) B −sisj sk
4i jk
16
.
Proof. For clarity of the proof, it will be helpful to introduce the temporary variables Y ′i = 1 − Yi, so
that E
(
Y ′i
)
= p′εi B (1 − pεi ). The normalized versions of Yi,Y ′i , Xi satisfy Y˜i = −12 X˜i, Y˜ ′i = 12 X˜i. By
independence E (T1) = ∑(i, j,k)∈E3 4i jk2 pεi p′ε j p′εk and therefore
T1 − E (T1) =
∑
(i, j,k)∈E3
4i jk
2
YiY ′jY
′
k −
∑
(i, j,k)∈E3
4i jk
2
pεi p
′
ε j
p′εk
=
∑
(i, j,k)∈E3
4i jk
2
[
(Yi − pεi )(Y ′j − p′ε j )(Y ′k − p′εk)
+ pεi (Y ′j − p′ε j )(Y ′k − p′εk ) + (Yi − pεi )p′ε j (Y ′k − p′εk ) + (Yi − pεi )(Y ′j − p′ε j )p′εk
− pεi p′ε j (Y ′k − p′εk ) − pεi (Y ′j − p′ε j )p′εk − (Yi − pεi )p′ε j p′εk
]
.
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Rewriting this in terms of the normalized random variables X˜i shows that this is equal to
∑
(i, j,k)∈E3
4i jk
16
[
sisj sk · (−X˜i)X˜j X˜k
+ sj sk · pεi X˜j X˜k + sisk · (−X˜i)p′ε j X˜k + sisj · (−X˜i)X˜jp′εk
− sk · pεi p′ε j X˜k − sj · pεi X˜jp′εk − si · (−X˜i)p′ε j p′εk
]
=
∑
(i, j,k)∈E3
4i jk
16
[ − sisj sk · X˜i X˜j X˜k + sisj · (pεk − 2p′εk )X˜i X˜j
− si · (2pε j p′εk − p′ε j p′εk )X˜i
]
= T1,1 + T1,2 + T1,3.
With similar calculations for T2 and T3, we get the claimed expressions. 
By independence of the X˜i, this decomposition provides a simple form for the variances of the Tα,β . For
instance,
Var
(
Tα,3
)
=
∑
(i, j,k)∈E3
t2α,3(i, j, k).
Recall that Ml for l = 0, . . . , L denotes the number of negative ties in embeddedness level l. This means
Ml =
∑
i∈E 1 {i ∈ El}Yi, where El is the set of edges with embeddedness l. Define the centered versions by
Mˇl B Ml − E (Ml) =
∑
i∈E
1 {i ∈ El}
(
Yi − pεi
)
=
∑
i∈E
hl(i)X˜i,
where hl(i) B − si2 1 {i ∈ El}, with variances
Var
(
Mˇl
)
=
∑
i∈E
1 {i ∈ El}
s2i
4
= nlpl(1 − pl) = ml(1 − pl). (4)
Proposition 3. Consider the vector
B(n) B
1√
n
(
T (n)1,1 ,T
(n)
1,2 ,T
(n)
1,3 ,T
(n)
2,1 ,T
(n)
2,2 ,T
(n)
2,3 ,T
(n)
3,1 ,T
(n)
3,2 ,T
(n)
3,3 , Mˇ
(n)
0 , . . . , Mˇ
(n)
L
)>
.
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with covariance matrix Γ(n) ∈ R(10+L)×(10+L). Under Assumption 2 we have the following:
1. Γ(n) converges to a matrix Γ component-wise as n→∞;
2. For α = 1, 2, 3 and l = 0, . . . , L, we have
sup
i∈E
1
n
h2l (i) → 0, sup
i∈E
1
n
t2α,1(i) → 0 (5)
sup
i∈E
1
n
∑
j∈E
t2α,2(i, j) → 0, sup
i∈E
1
n
∑
(j,k)∈E2
t2α,3(i, j, k) → 0. (6)
3. For α, β = 1, 2, 3 and l = 0, . . . , L we have
1
n2
E
(
(T (n)α,β)4
)
→ 3Γ23(α−1)+β,3(α−1)+β,
1
n2
E
(
(Mˇ (n)
l
)4
)
→ 3Γ210+l,10+l .
Proof. For simplicity, in the following we drop the index n.
1. We have for the covariances with α, β = 1, 2, 3 and l = 0, . . . , L
1
n
Cov
(
Tα,1,Tβ,1
)
=
1
n
∑
i∈E
tα,1(i)tβ,1(i), (7)
1
n
Cov
(
Tα,2,Tβ,2
)
=
1
n
∑
(i, j)∈E2
tα,2(i, j)tβ,2(i, j), (8)
1
n
Cov
(
Tα,3,Tβ,3
)
=
1
n
∑
(i, j,k)∈E3
tα,3(i, j, k)tβ,3(i, j, k), (9)
1
n
Cov
(
Tα,1, Mˇl
)
=
1
n
∑
i∈E
tα,1(i)hl(i), (10)
1
n
Cov
(
Mˇl, Mˇl
)
=
1
n
∑
i∈E
h2l (i),
while all other covariances are zero. In order to see that these terms converge, it suffices to show that they
are functions of (finite) linear combinations of the pl and of
ql1,l2,l3 =
1
n
∑
(i, j,k)∈El1, l2, l3
4i jk, ul1,l2,l3,l4,l5 = 1n
∑
i∈El1
©­«
∑
(j,k)∈El2, l3
4i jkª®¬ ©­«
∑
(j′,k′)∈El4, l5
4i j′k′ª®¬ ,
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for l1, l2, l3, l4, l5 = 0, . . . , L, which we assume to converge by Assumption 2. With respect to eq. (7) observe
that the tα,1(i) are of form
si
∑
(j,k)∈E2
4i jk fα(pε j , pεk ) = si
L∑
l2,l3=0
fα(pl2, pl3)
∑
(j,k)∈El2, l3
4i jk
for some functions fα. Hence, the covariances satisfy
1
n
Cov
(
Tα,1,Tβ,1
)
=
∑
i∈E
s2i
©­«
∑
(j,k)∈E2
4i jk fα(pε j , pεk )ª®¬ ©­«
∑
(j,k)∈E2
4i jk fβ(pε j , pεk )ª®¬
=
L∑
l1=0
4pl1(1 − pl1)F(l1),
where
F(l1) = 1n
∑
i∈El1
©­«
L∑
l2,l3=0
fα(pl2, pl3)
∑
(j,k)∈El2, l3
4i jkª®¬ ©­«
L∑
l2,l3=0
fβ(pl2, pl3)
∑
(j,k)∈El2, l3
4i jkª®¬
=
1
n
∑
i∈El1
L∑
l2,l3=0
L∑
l4,l5=0
fα(pl2, pl3) fβ(pl4, pl5)
∑
(j,k)∈El2, l3
4i jk
∑
(j′,k′)∈El4, l5
4i j′k′
=
L∑
l2,l3=0
L∑
l4,l5=0
fα(pl2, pl3) fβ(pl4, pl5)ul1,l2,l3,l4,l5 .
Next, with respect to eq. (8),
1
n
Cov
(
Tα,2,Tβ,2
)
=
1
n
∑
(i, j)∈E2
s2i s
2
j
(∑
k∈E
4i jk fα(pεk )
) ( ∑
k′∈E
4i jk′ fβ(pε′k )
)
=
1
n
L∑
l1,l2=0
16pl1(1 − pl1)pl2(1 − pl2)
∑
i∈El1,
j∈El2
∑
k∈E,
k′∈E
4i jk4i jk′ fα(pεk ) fβ(pεk′ ).
For fixed i, j there is only one k with 4i jk = 1. Thus, the last line equals
1
n
L∑
l1,l2=0
16pl1(1 − pl1)pl2(1 − pl2)
∑
(i, j)∈El1, l2
∑
k∈E
4i jk fα(pεk ) fβ(pεk )
=
L∑
l1,l2,l3=0
16pl1(1 − pl1)pl2(1 − pl2) fα(pl3) fβ(pl3)ql1,l2,l3,
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Similarly, for some Cα,β eq. (9) can be written as
1
n
Cov
(
Tα,3,Tβ,3
)
=
1
n
Cα,β
∑
(i, j,k)∈E3
s2i s
2
j s
2
k4i jk
= Cα,β
L∑
l1,l2,l3=0
43pl1(1 − pl1)pl2(1 − pl2)pl3(1 − pl3)ql1,l2,l3 .
On the other hand, the covariances between Tα,1 and Mˇl in eq. (10) satisfy
1
n
Cov
(
Tα,1, Mˇl
)
= −1
n
∑
i∈E
1 {i ∈ El}
s2i
2
∑
(j,k)∈E2
4i jk fα(pε j , pεk )
= −
L∑
l2,l3=0
2pl(1 − pl) fα(pl2, pl3)ql1,l2,l3 .
Finally, with respect to eq. (4)), 1n Var
(
Mˇl
)
=
nl
n pl(1 − pl) converges by convergence of nl/n (cf. eq. (2))
and of the pl.
2. Starting with eq. (5), we have
sup
i∈E
1
n
h2l (i) =
1 {i ∈ El} s
2
i
4
n
=
pl(1 − pl)
n
→ 0,
since, by Assumption 2, the pl converge and are therefore bounded. On the other hand, observe that
ε2i =
©­«12
∑
(j,k)∈E2
4i jkª®¬
2
>

t2α,1(i)∑
j∈E t2α,2(i, j)∑
(j,k)∈E2 t2α,3(i, j, k).
But ε2i ≤ L2, and so
sup
i∈E
1
n
t2α,1(i) ≤
1
n
sup
i∈E
ε2i ≤
L2
n
→ 0.
The two statements in eq. (6) follow similarly.
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3. Let us first consider T1,1. We have
1
n2
E
(
T41,1
)
=
1
n2
∑
(i, j,k,l)∈E4
t1,1(i)t1,1( j)t1,1(k)t1,1(l)E
(
X˜i X˜j X˜k X˜l
)
=
1
n2
∑
i∈E
t41,1(i)E
(
X˜4i
)
+
1
n2
(4
2
)
2
∑
(i, j)∈E2,i,j
t21,1(i)t21,1( j)E
(
X˜2i
)
E
(
X˜2j
)
=
1
n2
∑
i∈E
t41,1(i)
[
E
(
X˜4i
)
− 3
]
+ 3(Γ(n)1,1)2.
Focusing on the first term, note that
1
n2
∑
i∈E
t41,1(i) ≤
1
n
sup
i∈E
t21,1(i)
1
n
∑
i∈E
t21,1(i) =
1
n
sup
i∈E
t21,1(i)Γ(n)1,1 .
We already know, however, from part 2. of this proof that 1n supi∈E t
2
1,1(i) → 0. Thus, the first term converges
to 0, which means that 1
n2
E
(
T41,1
)
→ 3(Γ1,1)2, as required. The remaining limits follow similarly.

We are now ready to prove Proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 1. The three conditions in Proposition 3 imply by Theorem 1.1 of Zheng (2017) that
B(n)
D−→ N(0, Γ) as n→∞. Define the matrix Q : R10+L → R4+L by
Q =
©­­­­­­­­«
1 1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1
IL+1
ª®®®®®®®®¬
,
where IL+1 is the identity matrix of size L + 1. We conclude that
(
T˜ (n), M˜ (n)
)>
= QB(n)
D−→ N(0, Σ),
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with covariance matrix Σ = QΓQ>. The form of Q yields for α, β = 1, 2, 3, l = 0, . . . , L
Σα,α = lim
n→∞
1
n
3∑
β=1
Var
(
T (n)α,β
)
, Σα,β = lim
n→∞
1
n
3∑
γ=1
Cov
(
T (n)α,γ,T
(n)
β,γ
)
,
Σα,4+l = lim
n→∞
1
n
Cov
(
T (n)
α,1, Mˇ
(n)
l
)
, Σ4+l,4+l = lim
n→∞Var
(
Mˇ (n)
l
)
,
and Σ4+l,4+j = 0 for l, j = 0, . . . , L with l , j. Exact limits can be obtained from Proposition 3. 
B. Proof of Technical Lemmas
Proof of Lemma 1. We have to show for x = (xi)i∈E , xi ∈ {−1, 1}, that
P (Wpi = x) = P (X = x | M = m) .
By independence of edges Xi for different levels of embeddedness it is enough to show
P
(
Wτl = x
)
= P
((Xi)i∈El = x | Ml = ml )
for all levels l = 0, . . . , L separately and x = (xi)i∈El , xi ∈ {−1, 1}. Without loss of generality
∑
i∈El xi = ml
(otherwise both sides in the last display are zero). Since τl is a uniform random permutation on El, it is clear
that P
(
Wτl = x
)
=
( nl
ml
)−1. On the other hand,
P
((Xi)i∈El = x | Ml = ml ) = P ((Xi)i∈El = x,Ml = ml )P (Ml = ml) = P
((Xi)i∈El = x)
P (Ml = ml)
=
pml
l
(1 − pl)nl−ml( nl
ml
)
pml
l
(1 − pl)nl−ml
=
(
nl
ml
)−1
.

Proof of Lemma 2. Let m = (m0, . . . ,mL), m˜ = (m˜0, . . . , m˜L) with integers 0 ≤ ml ≤ m˜l ≤ n for all l =
0, . . . , L such that
∑L
l=0 ml,
∑L
l=0 m˜l ≤ n. Consider two graphs G = (V, E, (Wi)i∈E ) and G˜ = (V, E, (W˜i)i∈E )
with edge weights Wi, W˜i ∈ {−1, 1} such that ∑i∈El Bl = ml,∑i∈El B˜l = m˜l for all l = 0, . . . , L, where
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Bl =
1−Wi
2 , B˜l =
1−W˜i
2 . Define further
Rr =
∑
(i, j,k)∈4
1
{
Bpi(i) + Bpi(j) + Bpi(k) ≥ r
}
,
R˜r =
∑
(i, j,k)∈4
1
{
B˜pi(i) + B˜pi(j) + B˜pi(k) ≥ r
}
,
for r = 1, 2, 3 and with the random permutation pi. Rr and R˜r count the number of triangles with at least r
negative edges in G and G˜ (up to overcounting factors). According to Lemma 1, we have
L(R3, R2, R1) = L(HT | M = m),
L(R˜3, R˜2, R˜1) = L(HT | M = m˜).
Since Rr, R˜r are defined on the same probability space, it is sufficient to show Rr ≤ R˜r to prove stochastic
monotonicity (cf. Remark 2.1 of (Janson, 2007)). Moreover, it is enough to consider the special case that
m˜1 = m1 + 1 and ml = m˜l for l = 2, . . . , L. Since pi restricted to El is a uniform random permutation, we can
further assume without loss of generality that Wi0 = −1, W˜i0 = 1 for some i0 ∈ E1 and Wi = W˜i otherwise.
We claim that for (i, j, k) ∈ 4
1
{
Bpi(i) + Bpi(j) + Bpi(k) ≥ r
} ≤ 1 {B˜pi(i) + B˜pi(j) + B˜pi(k) ≥ r} .
If pi(i), pi( j), pi(k) are all different from i0 then equality holds trivially. Otherwise, assume that pi(i) = i0 and
pi( j), pi(k) , i0. Then, the inequality reduces to
1
{
Bpi(j) + Bpi(k) ≥ r
} ≤ 1 {B˜pi(j) + B˜pi(k) ≥ r − 1} ,
which is clearly true. Thus, Rr ≤ R˜r for r = 1, 2, 3. 
Proof of Proposition 2. We only have to show P
(
U(n)pi ≤ cα,τ
)
→ 1. Let µ(n)τ = E
(
U(n)τ
)
, (σ(n)τ )2 =
Var
(
U(n)τ
)
and define similarly µ(n)pi , σ
(n)
pi with respect to U
(n)
pi . From Corollary 1, we know that U
(n)
τ has
a limiting normal distribution. Thus, for large n and α ≤ 1/2 we can therefore approximate the α-critical
value of the old test, cα,τ , by µ(n)τ + zασ
(n)
τ with 0 ≥ zα B Φ−1(α). Moreover, according to Theorem 2, the
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Type-I error is given by
P
(
U(n)pi ≤ cα,τ
)
≈ Φ
(
cα,τ − µ(n)pi
σ
(n)
pi
)
≈ Φ
(
µ
(n)
τ + zασ
(n)
τ − µ(n)pi
σ
(n)
pi
)
.
Since n−1/2σ(n)pi → σpi and n−1/2σ(n)τ → στ for some σpi, στ > 0, we have
µ
(n)
τ + zασ
(n)
τ − µ(n)pi
σ
(n)
pi
=
µ
(n)
τ − µ(n)pi
n1/2σpi(1 + o(1))
+ zα
στ
σpi
(1 + o(1)) .
Again, by Theorem 2 and Corollary 1, approximating the means ofU(n)pi andU
(n)
τ by the corresponding means
in the Rademacher model, we have for large n
µ
(n)
τ − µ(n)pi ≈ 12
∑
(i, j,k)∈E3
4i jk
(
p(1 − p)2 − pεi (1 − pε j )(1 − pεk )
)
+
1
6
∑
(i, j,k)∈E3
4i jk
(
p3 − pεi pε j pεk
)
.
Observe that
1
2
pεi (1 − pε j )(1 − pεk ) +
1
6
pεi pε j pεk =
1
2
pεi −
1
2
pεi pε j −
1
2
pεi pεk +
2
3
pεi pε j pεk ,
which can be bounded by 12 pεi . Hence, for some constant c > 0
µ
(n)
τ − µ(n)pi ≥ c2
∑
(i, j,k)∈E3
4i jk
(
p(1 − p)2 − pεi
)
=
c
2
(
p(1 − p)2
∑
i∈E
εi −
∑
i∈E
pεiεi
)
=
c
2
(
p(1 − p)2
∑
i∈E
εi −
∑
i∈E−
εi
)
≥ mc
2
(
(1 − p)2
∑
i∈E εi
n
−
∑
i∈E− εi
m
)
≥ cm1/2 logm,
for a different c > 0 according to eq. (3), because pεi = mεi/nεi and p = m/n. Consequently,
m−1/2
(
µ
(n)
τ − µ(n)pi
)
converges to∞ and P
(
U(n)pi ≤ cα,τ
)
→ 1. 
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